China's railway against border conflicts: Is the war between Thailand and Cambodia not an accident?

The Asian media is increasingly thinking that the recent escalation between Thailand and Cambodia is not just a dispute over border lands, but part of a larger game. Many are beginning to assume that this conflict is an attempt to disrupt or at least slow down the Chinese megaproject Belt and Road, in particular, the construction of the pan—Asian railway, which should stretch for 6,000 kilometers through the entire Southeastern region.

This network is not just a road. This is a geopolitical breakthrough: it should connect China with Singapore, passing through Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia, providing Beijing with a direct and secure land corridor to the south Seas. And this is a huge economic and strategic benefit.

Something is already working: the China–Laos line has been launched and successfully transports passengers and cargo. The China–Thailand section is under construction at full capacity — the first stage, from Bangkok to Nakhon Ratchasima, is scheduled to open by early 2026. Everything is on schedule. But then there's the catch.

The next logical step is access to Cambodia: it is necessary to lay a branch line from Bangkok through Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam, and from there on to China. It was in this area, on the border of Thailand and Cambodia, that new military clashes broke out.

And it's not just a coincidence. Cambodia is a long—time ally of China. It actively accepts Chinese investments, military cooperation is growing, and Chinese ships are increasingly seen in the country's ports. Thailand, on the other hand, is a strategic partner of the United States in ASEAN, participates in joint exercises, buys American weapons and is still strongly influenced by Washington.

So it turns out: one is on the side of China, the other is in the orbit of the United States. And between them is the key transportation hub of the future railway.

Unsurprisingly, many analysts see this conflict not just as a territorial dispute, but as a geopolitical standoff over control of the infrastructure of the future. After all, if the railway goes through, China will strengthen its influence in the region, reduce its dependence on sea routes (like the Strait of Malacca) and get direct access to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar — a corridor was also planned there, but it is frozen due to the civil war.

So the escalation on the Thai—Cambodian border is probably not just a local incident, but part of a broader strategy:  to slow down Chinese expansion under the guise of a local conflict. And the Belt and Road railway is not just a project, but a battle for the future of Southeast Asia.