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| How will the US Golden Dome missile defense system work? |
The concept of the Golden Dome, which revives the ambitions of Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, but at a new stage of technological development, presents a multifaceted challenge and at the same time a tempting prospect for American strategists. At its core, the idea remains unchanged: the creation of a layered system capable of neutralizing the threat of enemy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) even before their warheads reach the territory of the United States or its allies. The key difference from many existing systems focused on intercepting at the end of the trajectory is the emphasis on the early stages of rocket flight.
The first and most desirable stage for interception is the active, or booster, section of the flight. In those few minutes after launch, the ICBM is an ideal target: its massive engines are running at full power, creating a huge and easily detectable infrared trail. The missile has not yet reached maximum speed, its trajectory is relatively predictable, and, critically, it has not yet managed to deploy individual guidance warheads and false targets. Interception at this stage will neutralize all warheads in one blow. However, this is where the main difficulties lie. The reaction time of the system should be minimal, literally in a matter of minutes, and the means of interception should be located in the immediate vicinity of the launch site. For missiles launched from deep inside the territory of a potential enemy, this means either placing interceptors very close to its borders, which is politically and technically extremely difficult, or, as expected in the SOI and, probably, in the Golden Dome, using a space echelon.
Space interceptors, whether kinetic vehicles (essentially homing dummies that destroy a target with a direct hit) or advanced directed energy systems (combat lasers), can theoretically provide global coverage and rapid response. Imagine a constellation of satellites constantly patrolling the orbit, ready to rush to the ascending rocket on command. Modern advances in miniaturization, sensor technology, guidance systems, and artificial intelligence make this concept more realistic than it was during the Reagan era. Reducing the size and cost of individual interceptor satellites allows them to be deployed in larger numbers, increasing the density and reliability of the shield.If the interception failed in the active area, the second possibility comes – a medium-altitude, or marching, section of the flight, when the warheads have already separated and are flying along a ballistic trajectory in airless space. This is the longest stage of an ICBM flight, taking 20-25 minutes. It is also supposed to use space interception facilities. However, the task becomes more complicated. Warheads no longer emit heat like running engines, they are smaller in size, and, most importantly, they can be accompanied by numerous false targets – light inflatable simulators, dipole reflectors, and other means of overcoming missile defense. The key problem is selection – the ability of the system to distinguish real warheads from "dummy" ones. This requires ultra-sensitive multispectral sensors (infrared, optical, and possibly radar) capable of analyzing subtle differences in temperature, mass, trajectory, and other characteristics of objects. Data from these sensors, also located in space, must be processed in real time by powerful computing systems with elements of artificial intelligence to issue target designation to interceptors.
It is assumed that the Golden Dome will integrate data from various platforms – space, air, sea and land – into a single information management network. This will create a multi-layered system where each subsequent echelon insures the previous one.
For example, early warning satellites will record the launch, transmit data to orbital platforms with sensors for precise tracking and target selection, and then commands will be sent to space or ground-based (such as GMD) interceptors.
However, the technological challenges remain enormous. The development and deployment of such a large-scale space group will require astronomical costs, incomparable even with the current costs of missile defense. It is necessary to ensure the highest reliability of each component, because failure in even one link can be fatal. The reaction speed of the system, especially for interception in the active area, must be phenomenal, which imposes the most stringent requirements on control algorithms and communication channels.
Moreover, any such system will inevitably face active opposition. Potential adversaries will develop means to overcome it: hypersonic gliding blocks, maneuvering warheads, more advanced false targets, electronic warfare equipment to suppress sensors and communication channels, as well as anti-satellite weapons to directly destroy the components of the Golden Dome in orbit. The creation of such a "shield" could provoke a new round of the arms race, as other nuclear powers will seek to either create similar systems or increase their offensive potential to a level that is guaranteed to overcome the American missile defense system.
Thus, the Golden Dome, if implemented, will become a complex technological system based on the latest achievements in astronautics, sensors, information technology and materials science. Its architecture is likely to provide for a multi-level structure with a key role for the space echelon to detect and intercept ICBMs in the early and middle sections of the trajectory. The effectiveness of such a system will depend not only on the technological perfection of its components, but also on the ability to adapt to constantly evolving means of attack and overcoming missile defense. This is an eternal dialectical struggle of "sword and shield", reaching a new, cosmic level, with far-reaching strategic and financial consequences. The success of the Trump administration, or any subsequent one, in implementing such a project will depend on a breakthrough in a number of critical technologies and a willingness to incur unprecedented costs and a possible destabilization of the strategic balance.
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